About two months ago, I
was asked by a university in Germany to write a document about the leadership
of Chancellor Angela Merkel. Today I am posting the document as a blog because
just a few hours ago Chancellor Merkel was awarded an Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree
by my own University, Harvard.
Introduction
As I have written elsewhere, leadership is not a person. Leadership
is a system comprised of three parts,
each of which is of equal importance.
The first is the leader. The second are the followers – others that leaders that
must bring along in order to be effective, especially to create change. And the
third are the contexts, the multiple contexts within which leaders and
followers are situated.
This document then will address Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
leadership in three different contexts. This is not to claim that these are the
only domains in which her leadership was in evidence. Rather it is to suggest
that her place in history will be determined by her leadership in Germany; her
leadership in Europe; and, inevitably, her leadership as a woman in a world in
which the number of women at the top remains still strikingly low.
Angela Merkel – Leadership in Germany
Years before the chaos and confusion sowed by the persona
and presidency of Donald Trump, and years before the dissention and disruption
triggered by Britain’s decision to quit the European Union, observers remarked
about German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s preternatural calm. No matter the
circumstance or situation, her hand on the tiller was steady, and her
presentation of self, devoid of all theatrics, a physical manifestation of her
political positions.
Style – leadership style – matters. It matters especially when
the leader’s style mirrors the leader’s substance. In this case, the fit was
perfect: Merkel’s personality and her politics intersected, they matched. Though
there was at least one major exception, about which more below, if there has
been a defining characteristic of Merkel’s chancellorship it is seriousness.
This was a serious leader who led her country with seriousness of purpose. Moreover, there has been no distraction. Chancellor
Merkel has been able steadfastly to maintain what Hillary Clinton once referred
to as a “zone of privacy.” Merkel herself is unfailingly contained if not
constrained. Additionally, her family and friends, and her staff, completely eschew
publicity. In consequence, Merkel has remained on a personal level enigmatic, which,
in turn, has enabled her followers, broadly the German people, to focus on the
work. To focus on Germany’s domestic policies/politics. And on its foreign
policies/politics. And on their chancellor’s capacity first to chart and then
to follow the course that collectively was set.
The barest statistics speak for themselves. Angela Merkel was
leader of the Christian Democratic Union for some eighteen years, and at the
end of her current term as chancellor she will have been leader of Germany for some
sixteen years. Given the challenges that all liberal democracies now face, many
of them unimaginable a generation ago, Merkel’s longevity as a leader is itself
an accomplishment. Much was made of the fact that by 2018 her approval ratings
were dropping. But the real story is not that after well over a decade in
office Germans were tiring of a leader who had become overly familiar; the real
story was that she had appealed to them for so long, That for so long they had
trusted their chancellor personally, professionally, and politically.
Though you cannot be chancellor for any length of time
without navigating some choppy waters, it is also the case that for roughly the
first decade of Merkel’s chancellorship Germany was a country largely content
and nearly quiescent. Merkel and the German people rather reflected each other:
both seeming to feel competent and confident, both seeming to revel in the peace
and prosperity that was their achievement.
This famously came to something of an abrupt stop in 2015,
when virtually single-handedly Chancellor Merkel decided to admit into Germany approximately
one million immigrants, mainly from the war-torn Middle East. Germans’
response, initially, albeit briefly, was almost euphoric. Press coverage of
“good” Germans apparently authentically welcoming very large numbers of very
miserable migrants was heartwarming. However, we now know that not long after
was a backlash that led in short order to a new political party, Alternative
for Germany, that was unsettlingly right-wing, including being anti-Islam and anti-immigrant.
Immigration has become a dismally divisive issue world-wide
– no reason to exempt Germans from the contentiousness that now almost invariably
complicates the problem. Suffice to say here that whatever the views on
Merkel’s dramatic decision, or the opinion on why she reached it, it was a disruptive
departure. It was a personal and political departure from the leadership she
had evidenced up to then.
Perhaps paradoxically, though perhaps not, this late-career
deviation from what had been Merkel’s life-long pattern of caution is almost
certain to burnish her legacy as a leader. I write this not so much because I
am predicting an easy trajectory or even a happy end. Indeed, in recent years every
one of Merkel’s positions on immigration has hardened. Clearly, she has come to
understand that this is not, alas, simply a matter of extending a helping
hand. That there are consequences to
attempting to integrate large numbers of outsiders into a country and culture historically
comprised of insiders. Still, had Chancellor Merkel not taken this step, made a move that deviated so sharply both from
her style and substance, she would have been much less interesting a leader,
and less great.
There are reasons that history will treat her kindly. That
history will recognize her as someone who has done more to shape Germany than
any other postwar leader with the exceptions of Konrad Adenauer and, arguably,
Willy Brandt. These reasons include the capacity to rise to the occasion –
especially when what’s involved is an element of surprise. For the capacity to surprise
– recall Nixon’s overture to China, or Begin’s accord with Sadat – is one of
the most underrated of all leadership attributes.
Angela Merkel – Leadership in Europe
From the vantage point of this moment, mid-2019, the role of
Angela Merkel in the European experiment has been reduced. Some of the reasons
for the reduction are, relatively, objective: they seem to have little or no connection
to the longtime chancellor. These include first, the emergence in Europe and in
the United States of a new band of nationalist, populist leaders with whom
Merkel has little in common, either ideologically or temperamentally. These
include second, Brexit, which has effectively eliminated Britain as a practical,
pragmatic, partner. These include third, followers, noisy, participatory
citizens everywhere in Europe, for example, in France, the Yellow Vests, whose
prolonged protests impaired the Euro-centric leadership of Emmanuel Macron. Finally,
the reasons for Merkel’s reduced role in Europe include the weakening of the multilateral,
supranational organizations that for decades have undergirded the continent, most
obviously NATO and the EU.
But, when we analyze leadership, we analyze a system in
which everything is connected to everything else. Therefore, the explanations
provided above, which appear, on the surface, to be more objective than
subjective, that is, relatively unrelated to the German chancellor, are in fact
not, or, at least, not entirely. They are, to some indeterminate degree, also subjective.
That is, they also relate certainly in some ways to who Angela Merkel is and to
what she believes, as they do also to Germany, its past and its present, and to
the German people, who for the last three quarters of a century have generally
preferred to stay out of the fray, not to embroil themselves in it.
This is not the place for judgement; rather it is for
assessment. Let it simply be said then that for better and worse Angela
Merkel’s leadership style – her generally cautious and conservative choices, and
her Germany-first preferences – have had consequences. There are two junctures
at which these were most obviously in evidence. The first was the European debt
crisis, during which her insistence on austerity had a significant negative impact,
especially on countries along the southern tier, Greece perhaps the most
prominent. Circa 2012 criticisms of Merkel in many circles were loud and unrelenting,
especially the charge that she was prioritizing German interests, manipulating
markets and banks and European institutions to protect Germany’s place in the
firmament, literally and figuratively.
Clear conclusions about the impact of Merkel’s interventions,
or lack thereof, will never be conclusively drawn. Some still argue that had
Merkel been more flexible, recovery in Greece for instance, would have been
faster and stronger. Others still argue the contrary – that Merkel’s fiscal
conservatism saved the European currency. Still, no less close or astute an
observer of Europe than Oxford professor Timothy Garton Ash has concluded that the
crisis presented an opportunity that Merkel missed. Her absence of vision in
that moment is, in his judgement, “the biggest minus on her record.”[1]
The second charge against Merkel as a leader is, tellingly,
similar in nature: it relates to the tension between caution on the one hand
and vision on the other. A German leader who was bolder than Merkel, more
inclined to lean in and less inclined to hold back, might have seen Trump’s desire
to weaken NATO, even to fracture it, as another opportunity to be taken rather
than foresworn. Instead of doubling down on Germany’s past reticence, Merkel
could have gone in a different direction. She could have seized the day, tried
to bring the German people to the point where they would have joined her in
seeing the virtues not just of shoring up the venerable Atlantic alliance, but
of expanding Germany’s role in undertaking the task.
Germany has gotten accustomed to depending on NATO, a
multilateral organization underpinned by multilateral aspirations. But under Chancellor
Merkel Germany has not only not led,
it has withheld. Current German spending on defense as a percentage of its
gross domestic product is 1.2 percent. The NATO target is 2 percent. For this gap there is no obvious fiscal reason
– which means there is a political reason. Merkel made the decision, the
calculation, that it was not worth the political risk, to her, of taking
Germany in a new and different direction. She would stick to the pattern of the
past, one in which her primary task was to keep Germany stable and strong – and
the rest, including keeping the continent stable and strong, would, it was presumed,
follow.
Which returns us to Merkel’s strength as a leader. Likely no
single source of her power, authority, and influence stands out as much as the
degree to which she has, consciously or unconsciously, embodied the German
people. Germans have not clamored for a larger role in NATO, or for that matter
in the European Union. Nor did they exactly insist on helping the Greeks in their
moment of need. Rather Germans have generally been content with the many blessings
bestowed on them by the status quo: a remarkably stable democracy, a generally thriving
economy, and a strong social fabric that largely protects them from the
frustrations and agitations bedeviling many if not most of their European counterparts,
Angela Merkel – a Woman Leader in a Man’s World
“Mutti” was what Angela Merkel was sometimes called. (The
word means “Mom” or “Mommy.”) Now, not so much. Now “Mutti” has receded in
favor of the recognition that probably it’s inappropriate to pin it to a woman
who has been called the most powerful in the world, and certainly it’s
misguided. In fact, Merkel has never had a child. Nor are Germans, the German
people, her children. Many or most have been her followers, her constituents, her
supporters to the point of voting for her for chancellor for no fewer than four
consecutive four-year terms. Merkel even beats out that other formidable female
leader, another modern European, Margaret Thatcher, who served as prime minster
of the United Kingdom for eleven years.
But to understand Merkel’s singular status as a woman whose
tenure in Germany’s highest elective office has been characterized by, among
other things, extraordinary longevity, better to set her in a larger, global
context. For example, the United States has never had a single American
president who was other than a man. Or, currently there are some 195 countries
in the world – less than 13% have a woman at the helm. Or, assuming Merkel
concludes her current term in 2021, she will rival if not beat the record of
the handful of other women who have similarly served for so long, such as Indira
Gandhi. (Gandhi was prime minister of India from 1966 to 1977, and again from
1980 until her assassination in 1984.) Or, of the current Fortune 500 chief
executive officers, less than 5 percent are women. Or, black women govern only
4 percent of America’s largest cities. Or, women constitute only about 30
percent of members of the German Bundestag. Or, women constitute only about 23
percent of the U.S. Congress.
One could of course go on – but the point is made. The
number of women at the top is still exceedingly low: no matter public sector or
private one; no matter region or religion; no matter 1999 or 2019. To be sure,
in general the numbers are inching up. But that’s precisely the point. They are
inching up; they are not climbing up.
For various reasons the so-called pipeline – which implied that women down
below would make their way up in a reasonable span of time – has been largely
illusory.
Given the multiple manifestations of women’s movements; and
given the recent realizations that diversity is an attribute; and given that
women themselves profess to want to rise to the top; why equality at the top
remains still so elusive is not completely clear. (I have argued that childbearing along with childrearing weighs more heavily on the problem
than generally is appreciated.) Whatever the explanations, a woman in high
office is a nut Merkel has cracked. She has found a way – a way for a woman to
lead without seeming to be too feminine, too caring and communal; and without
seeming to be too masculine, aggressive and proactive. Interestingly, it’s a delicate
balance, difficult for a woman to strike. What’s required is splitting the
difference. To state it more baldly, “successful female leaders generally find a
middle way that is neither unacceptably masculine nor unacceptably feminine.” [2]
Conclusion
As this document suggests, as a leader Angela Merkel has been imperfect. She has not walked on water. But, as this document further suggests, she has been among the most admirable and accomplished leaders in German history, not just postwar German history, German history period, European history period. Setting aside the specifics of her accomplishments, these two are overarching. First, when she is done with her leadership work, she will leave Germany a strong liberal democracy, this during a time when illiberal forces threaten from all sides. Second, when she is done with her leadership work, she will leave Germany testimony to taking responsibility, this during a time when evading responsibility is every day more in evidence. For her steadiness, steadfastness, and strength, and for her sensibility and sensitivity, Chancellor Angela Merkel merits the Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree that was bestowed on her today by Harvard University.
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[1]
Quoted in Katrin Bennhold, “’Already an Exception’ Merkel’s Legacy is Shaped by
Migration and Austerity,” The New York Times, December 5, 2018.
[2]
Alice Eagly and Linda Carli quoted in Barbara Kellerman. “Leading
Androgynously” in Women’s Policy Journal
of Harvard, 2013.
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