Dictators are paranoid. They must be, they have no choice. For them to survive, for them to remain at the center of the action and above everyone and everything, they must see around every corner. They must presume enemies everywhere lurking and be ready at a moment’s notice to take them out. To eliminate or even dispose of them, permanently. How else to continue indefinitely to reign supreme?
Consider the case of the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan is not a dictator; he is an autocrat. Still, he has been leader of Turkey for two decades, was recently reelected, and has evolved over the years into an unrepentant Strongman. It is precisely because he developed a paranoid streak that he tightened his by now nearly ironclad grip on every lever of power.
When Erdogan was attacked, he attacked right back. On July 15, 2016, a faction of the Turkish military attempted a coup against him and his government. The attempt was bloody and deadly: several hundred people were killed, over 2,000 people were injured, and government buildings were bombed.
But in no time flat it was evident the coup had failed. Moreover, in no time flat Erdogan was hunting down those he perceived as his enemies. Five days after the failed coup Erdogan was punishing mutinous soldiers and purging whoever else he deemed a traitor or danger, including judges, governors, civil servants, teachers, and every university dean in the country.
Which brings us to the situation in Russia: what if any are the similarities and what are the differences? The most obvious similarity is that Russian President Vladimir Putin is like Erdogan though worse – Putin is inarguably a dictator and he is inarguably paranoid. This means that he has been hellbent – especially in recent years – on destroying or even eliminating his enemies. His track record in this regard is indisputable. He threatens those who dare to dissent or disagree; or he punishes them, sometimes severely; or he kills them.
Why then didn’t Putin squash Yevgeny Prigozhin like the proverbial bug? Prigozhin had after all been attacking him viciously, albeit vicariously for months. Attacking the president of Russia not directly, but indirectly, specifically by accusing the Russian military of, effectively, professional malpractice. Moreover, Prigozhin was not only increasingly publicly critical, even finally of the war in Ukraine, but he was also building his own power base. The Wagner Group, that sizable band of hardcore mercenaries who were doing much of the hardest, heaviest lifting in Ukraine, was loyal not to Putin, but to Prigozhin. It was the latter who was their leader, not the former.
This in turn yields the difference. The difference between Putin and other autocrats, dictators, and tyrants who had no compunctions about eliminating the competition. Putin needed Prigozhin. He needed Prigozhin’s help. He needed Prigozhin’s men. He needed Prigozhin’s Wagner group to help fight Putin’s War in Ukraine.
Again, dictators and even autocrats are paranoid for good reason. Their paranoia serves them well. It protects them against their antagonists and adversaries, against their challengers and competitors. Their paranoia is, literally, functional and when it fails them, they are at risk. To wit the events in Russia of the last day and a half. To wit the odd bargain struck by Putin and Prigozhin – especially given the first had only hours earlier accused the second of being a “traitor.”
Putin’s War is why Putin’s paranoia ebbed when it should have flowed. Putin’s War is why his paranoia failed to protect him against his most obvious, dangerous internal enemy. Putin’s War made Putin needy – which is why in this instance his paranoia did not do its dirty work.