As previously indicated, the Corporate Finance Institute describes a key man as someone who is so “critical to the operation of the business” that their “death, absence, or disability may have a significant negative effect.” “Key men” are “great men.” They are leaders who if, for whatever reason, vanish overnight, leave their followers flailing. Leave them struggling to find a successor who can come close to filling the great man’s shoes.
No group or organization should ever be in this position – but Nvidia is. Which raises the question of how it happened that such a wildly successful company got mired in such idiocy. The answer requires we look not just at the leader but at the leadership system. This system consists of three parts, each of which is equally important: 1) the leader; 2) the followers; and 3) the context.
The Leader
However humble Jensen Huang’s early years, in recent years he was widely described as arrogant and controlling. According to his biographer, Stephen Witt, he had “little tolerance for disagreement and almost no capacity for open discourse.” If you contradicted him “it was like lighting a fuse.” If you stuck to your guns he “exploded screaming at you for your idiocy.” Turns out Huang was the jerk. Personally, he violated simple common sense by consorting for years with a woman who was possibly if not probably a “Chinese spy.” Further he violated Nvidia’s own code of conduct by getting romantically involved with a direct subordinate. Professionally, he structured Nvidia as if he were immortal. Noone dared raise the subject of a succession plan. And by omitting layers of management – Huang had some 60 people reporting directly to him – he made certain that he was the sun around whom the other planets would pivot. Finally, Huang’s lust for success knew no bounds. His chips were going to get to China somehow, one way or another, naysayers and dissenters be damned.
The Followers
Huang’s most important followers have largely themselves to blame for Nvidia’s miserable mess. I refer specifically to the 10-person board. Because its deference to Huang was near total, the board failed to meet its obligation both to the company and to its shareholders. Most board members have a large, very large, financial stake in Nvidia, and most board members have a personal as well as professional relationship to the chief executive. Members of Nvidia’s board nearly never contradicted or challenged Huang – they certainly never defied him. Why was a succession plan never seriously discussed much less acted on? Because the key man didn’t like the idea. Just a few months ago, Huang made clear he saw himself as indispensable. “There will never be [another Nivida CEO] like me,” Huang said, “and the reason for that is because I was raised by the company.” His most important followers, in addition to the board? How about the president of the United States, who deferred to Huang at every turn, gave him what he wanted when he wanted it, and after Huang was revealed to have strayed, perhaps even betrayed, gave him a pass. Said Donald Trump about the possibility of restoring Jensen Huang as CEO, “I “would certainly not mind.” Likely “he learned a big lesson.”
The Context
The context will be discussed in the third and final part of this post.
